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It began in 1957 when I received via a colleague a batch
of sera from kuru patients and some controls from
Carleton Gajdusek. I was immensely excited, as was
Carleton, when I found a quite remarkable elevation of
some a and b globulin components in the kuru sera that
seemed to be absent from the controls. However, our
excitement cooled in the face of more data that
indicated that the sera in question had come from
very sick, malnourished people suffering from major
intercurrent infections, decubitus ulcers and the like.
Thatis,wewereobservingareactivehyperglobulinaemia,
an epiphenomenon rather than a ﬁnding central to
kuru. My overreaction to the initial ﬁnding was almost
certainly due to the fact that at the time I was very
interested in the paraproteinaemias of myeloma and
other malignancies of the immune system and was ready
to put down our kuru ﬁndings to some unique
dysproteinaemia. So, the ﬁrst great lesson that dipping
into kuru research taught me was that we see what we
are trained to see.
In 1953, the anthropologists Ronald and Catherine
Berndt thought that the disease reﬂected a hysterical
reaction of the Fore people to existential threats to their
lifestyle by the advent of Europeans in the Eastern
Highlands. So, this was another example of scholars
seeing what they were trained to see.
However, the kuru genetic hypothesis was the prime
illustration of the dangers posed by a ﬁrmly held
scientiﬁc viewpoint when held by an inﬂuential group.
The ﬁrst genealogies collected in the ﬁeld showed that
the disease had a strong family association and, in their
incomplete state, the data could reasonably be held to
point to the existence of a Ku gene, possibly with its
expression modiﬁed by a recently introduced environ-
mental factor. In the early years, nearly all who thought
about the disease conceded that genetics might play
some part.
Prof. J. H. Bennett, the chief protagonist of the
genetic hypothesis, held the chair of genetics at
Adelaide University. He was a ﬁne classical geneticist
and his erstwhile Cambridge mentor, Sir Roland
Fisher FRS, was at the time in Adelaide as guest of
the CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial
Research Organization). Backed by H. N. Robson,
Prof. of Medicine at Adelaide, they became known as
the Adelaide Group, which went on to enjoy powerful
leverage with sections of the Australian political and
medicalestablishments.Politically,theGroup’sinvolve-
ment was a demonstration that we took our trusteeship
oftheTerritoryofPapuaandNewGuineaseriouslyand
werenotprepared toleavetheﬁeld toCarletonwhowas
seen as foreign invader. This was an important
consideration when colonial administrations of all
types were being heavily criticized. The anglophile
sensitivities of many in the medical establishment had
been outraged that an American was playing on their
pitch and they saw the existence of the Adelaide Group
as an important expression of our concern for the
welfare of the Fore people. None of this might have
mattered much had it stopped at being a reﬂection of
healthy academic chauvinism, spiced with a little cold
war realpolitik, since Carleton had the ability and means
to carry out a comprehensive study of kuru by himself,
while the Adelaide Group could have busied itself
verifying, or falsifying, the genetic hypothesis. Unfortu-
nately, the chauvinism became decidedly unhealthy
withproposalstoexcludeCarletonfromtheﬁeld,which
would have given the collection of genealogies a
head start. Such a situation would have been very
satisfyingtothosewhoarguedthatAustraliacouldsolve
the kuru problem from its own resources, an argument
based on our undoubted strengths in genetics. While
eventually the genetic hypothesis was falsiﬁed, its
monopoly of the ﬁeld, even for a season, could have
disrupted many of Carleton’s collaborative arrange-
ments with unpredictable results. Just as seriously, the
genetic hypothesis was so strongly held that proposals
arose to ‘quarantine’ the Fore people so that the
hypothetical Ku would not spread elsewhere in Papua
New Guinea; even eugenic measures such as steriliza-
tion were contemplated.
Compared with the other public health problems
facing the country, to the Papua New Guinea authori-
ties kuru was a minor diversion that threatened to blow
up into an international incident. Faced with this
situation, the administration and its advisers sought
independent opinions that queried the strengths of the
arguments for a genetic quarantine. Interestingly, very
few of those who advised against eugenic measures did
so on moral grounds but were more concerned with
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enforcement. About the same time, opposition to
Carleton’s early return to the ﬁeld was dropped.
Again, the decision was based on pragmatism rather
than principle. Carleton had the full support of the
National Institutes of Health of Australia’s ‘great and
powerful friend’ and it was becoming clear, even to the
sceptics, that his energetically pursued multi-pronged
approach offered the best chance of understanding this
bafﬂing disease. From then on, the Papua New Guinea
Department of Public Health gave him every assist-
ance, making a major local contribution to solving the
problem in its own right.
The ﬁnal lessons that I learnt from those early kuru
years were that tightly held hypotheses and public
policy were a dangerous mix and that bureaucratic
decision makers and their advisers frequently favour
expediency over principle. Although in the case of
kuru the issues were simple enough for those of
goodwill to negotiate a positive solution, in more
complex situations such an approach has frequently
ended in disaster. These lessons have stayed with me
over a varied career that included some studies,
independent of kuru, in Papua New Guinea and periods
as a research programme manager in various settings
in CSIRO.
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